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_____________________________________________________________ 
SUMMARY 
 
We find a significant positive link between motor vehicle ownership and obesity in 
industrialized countries. Surprisingly this association holds for countries with a common 
law tradition but not for those based on civil law. These relations hold whether we 
examine trend data, simple correlations, cross-section regression analysis, or panel data 
regressions. An increase of 100 motor vehicles per thousand residents is associated with a 
six percentage point increase in obesity in Common Law countries but not in Civil Law 
countries. The robustness of this main result and the clear link between increased 
ownership of motor vehicles and reduced physical activity suggests the association is 
causal. Motor vehicle dependence is an important link in the growth of obesity in 
countries with a tradition of common law where individual liberty is encouraged; the link 
is statistically non-existent in countries with a civil law background where the rights of 
the individual tend to be circumscribed by the power of the state. This suggests that 
efforts to discourage the over-reliance on the automobile would have the greatest obesity 
reducing impact precisely in those countries where it is most difficult, in terms of legal 
heritage, to implement such measures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To contribute to the debate on the international obesity epidemic, we examine OECD data on 
motor vehicle ownership and obesity in the context of legal heritage. We make use a range of 
empirical techniques including trend data, simple correlations, cross-sectional and panel data 
analysis. We find significant evidence of a direct relationship between motor vehicle ownership 
and obesity, confirming a physical inactivity linkage. Moreover, we find, strikingly, that this 
effect is very strong in countries with a common law heritage and either nonexistent or very 
much weaker in countries with a civil law heritage. As the common law heritage is to restrict the 
power of the state and the civil law heritage is to extend the power of the state, this finding is not 
entirely unexpected. Still it suggests that countries with a common law heritage are at a 
disadvantage in combating the obesity promoting effects of over-reliance on motor vehicles. This 
appears in a stark contrast to now well-established superior performance of common law for 
economic welfare, compared to civil law. 
Two core competing explanations for the rising tide of obesity both in the US and 
elsewhere1 are (i) the role of reduced exercise, especially on the job, see Lakdawalla and 
Philipson [2002], Philipson [2001] and Philipson and Posner [1999] and (ii) increased calorie 
intake, see Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003). The latter derive a fundamental equation relating 
daily calories consumed (K), an exercise index summing up total daily physical activity (E), and 
weight (W) in the steady-state: 
  ( ) KWEK *1.* +++= βα  (1) 
                                                 
1 See OECD Health Division data at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/51/37622205.xls for data showing rising obesity 
rates in all OECD countries, albeit from very different levels. The U.S. doubled its rate from around 15 percent in 
1978 to over 30 by 2000; in the UK the rate tripled from around 7 in 1980 to 21 percent by 2000; most countries on 
the continent of Europe rose from 5 to 7 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to the 9 to 13 percent range by the early 
2000’s. The contrast in levels may not be quite as stark because the European levels are based on self-reports while 
those for the USA and the UK are based on actual measurements taken. Nevertheless substantial differences in levels 
would likely remain were the Europeans to use the same measurement techniques. 
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Increases in caloric intake or reductions in physical activity will, other things equal, raise weight. 
Philipson emphasizes the role of technological change in reducing the physical 
expenditure of calories per hour worked in the market and at home. This raises the cost of 
expending calories as time is diverted from leisure activities rather than exercise being a by-
product of work hours. Following the lead of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny  
[1999], Cutler et al stress the role of legal heritage and regulatory authority on access to food 
preparation technology. Restricted access to mass food preparation technology raises the price of 
fast, calorie-heavy, meals, thus limiting the caloric intake and hence the development of obesity. 
We explore how legal heritage and regulatory authority on motor vehicle usage restrictions 
connect to obesity via the reduced physical activity linkage. 
Cutler et al also suggest that changes in commuting mode from pedestrian or public 
transit to private vehicle are too small to explain the surge in US obesity over the past twenty-
five years. They conclude, therefore, that increased caloric intake, not reduced caloric 
expenditure, is the more likely culprit in the obesity epidemic. We revisit this question, providing 
strong evidence on whether reduced exercise contributes to the emerging pattern of obesity both 
cross-country and over time. Rather than focusing on commuting mode alone, we consider the 
relationship between motor vehicle ownership and the associated level of obesity.2 
La Porta et al [1999] note that common law tradition (as in England) is a proxy for intent 
to limit the state while civil law tradition as in France, Germany and other European countries is 
a proxy for intent to extend the power of the state. Common Law countries tend to emphasize the 
private rights of individuals in any regulation; Civil Law countries focus regulation on obtaining 
                                                 
2 A measure of usage would be ideal but the most consistently reported datum across countries over time is the 
number of motor vehicles per capita. Although not ideal, this latter measure captures differences across countries in 
the tendency to drive motorized vehicles in agricultural, industrial and other pursuits, as well as on-the-job, running 
errands, and  using drive-through facilities. 
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an appropriate resolution from the state’s viewpoint. Quoting Damaska (1986), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2007) express the difference as: while Common Law is “dispute 
resolving”, Civil Law is “policy implementing”. Further, alluding to Pistor (2006), they note that 
Common Law supports “unconditioned private contracting” in contrast to French Civil Law, 
which embraces “socially conditioned private contracting”. Given that legal system refers to 
overarching ideas, rules and regulations in a country, La Porta et al (2007) “adopt a broad 
conception of legal origin as a style of social control of economic life (and maybe of other 
aspects of life as well)” (p. 3). This conception is supported with the proven impact of legal 
origins on several spheres of economic life, such as on financial development, unemployment, 
investment and entry to business, the size of unofficial economy, and international trade.  
Following La Porta et al’s (2007) notion that the influence of legal origins extends to 
social control of life, we argue that,  in Civil Law countries, the state will tend to place greater 
restraint on the private use of motor vehicles, especially with respect to commuting. These 
restraints often take the form of high taxes, high parking fees, parking restrictions, limited 
spaces, restrictions on urban sprawl, or outright bans on motor vehicle usage. The Transportation 
Research Board [2001] notes that “Gasoline prices are indeed much higher in Western Europe 
than in the United States, mainly because of higher taxes. Moreover, motor vehicle sales and 
excise taxes, registration charges, license fees, and other government levies are higher.” On 
parking, the Transportation Research Board reports that fewer than ten percent of American 
commuters pay any parking fee. In contrast, “Although many Western European businesses also 
provide free parking for their customers and employees, a higher proportion of businesses are 
located in commercial districts where parking is limited by available space and government 
regulations.” This latter quote makes it clear that governments in Western Europe have restricted 
parking. While the comparison is made with the USA, which is probably the extreme case among 
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common law countries, it should hold, to a lesser degree for the general comparison between 
common and civil law countries. This suggests that increased motor vehicle ownership in 
Common Law countries will have fewer restraints placed on individual discretion; in Civil Law 
countries, regulation will tend to arise to channel the use of motor vehicles in ways the state 
perceives to be appropriate. Mass transit alternatives benefit from these restrictions under civil 
law with associated increased physical activity. 
Civil law countries may also be associated with greater regulatory barriers to the spread 
of home ownership to the far suburbs, with its concomitant decrease in population density and 
increased reliance on motor vehicles. One datum consistent with this claim is related to urban 
sprawl. If we consider OECD cities of 1.5 million population or larger, twenty-seven rank in the 
top 100 largest cities in the world, ranked by population density. Twenty-two are in Civil law 
countries and five are in Common Law countries. In the next 100 most dense cities, thirty are in 
Common Law countries and five are in Civil Law countries, just the reverse. Large cities in 
Common Law countries tend to have lower density, consistent with the notion that these 
countries have fewer restrictions on urban sprawl. (City Mayors [2007]) In fact, automobile 
dependence that this creates in Common law countries is evident from Houghton’s (2003) 
estimates of per capita greenhouse gas emissions: of the top twenty countries in the world with 
the highest per capita gas emission in 2000, sixteen were Common law countries.3 Hence the 
cross-country impact of increased motor vehicle ownership on the level of obesity may differ by 
legal heritage. 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, International Association of Public Transport (2005) points to the difference between Civil and 
Common Law countries as follows: “the gaps separating ‘energy efficient’ towns from ‘high energy consumption’ 
towns are considerable: from 12,000 to 16,000 mega Joules per year per inhabitant in the majority of European 
towns to over 30,000 in North American and Australian towns. In concrete terms, this gap represents 400 to 500 kg 
of crude oil per inhabitant per year.” Further to the point, Catford (2003) reports that transport is the second highest 
household expenditure item in Australia (15.5%), with 93.6% of this being for private motoring and 6.4% of it being 
for public transport. 
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In our work we focus on OECD countries; these have the advantage that all member 
countries are relatively advanced in their economic development, have relatively standard data 
across countries and over time, yet with different cultural and legal traditions. We distinguish 
primarily between Civil and Common Law countries, but also consider sub-categories of Civil 
Law, such as French, German, Scandinavian and Old Socialist legal systems. One difficulty for 
the analysis is the potential endogeneity of motor vehicles per capita in an obesity regression. 
One can imagine that in countries with more obese residents there would be greater pressure on 
governments to accommodate obesity by encouraging motor vehicle ownership and usage rather 
than public transit. We address this problem in a very intuitive way by using as instruments 
Petrol and M2/GDP. The former captures the gasoline purchasing power of GDP which 
influences the affordability and extent of use should a motor vehicle be purchased, and the latter 
captures the financial depth in a country which influences the availability of credit to finance the 
purchase of a motor vehicle. Both should be determinants of motor vehicle ownership but should 
be uncorrelated with the obesity regression error term. 
We develop our estimation framework through several steps by adopting cross-sectional 
analysis, OLS regressions, panel analysis (pooled regressions, fixed and random effects 
regressions), and two-stage least squares estimations. In our preferred models, a two-stage least 
squares fixed effects (random effects) regression, we find that, overall, having one hundred extra 
motor vehicles per thousand residents raises obesity rates by 5.7 (5.6) percentage points but this 
effect is substantially and significantly reduced in most civil law countries. In fact, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is a zero effect in countries with German, Scandinavian, or 
Old Socialist legal heritage; there is a small positive effect for the French legal heritage 
countries. Reductions in the ownership of motor vehicles in common law countries would have a 
substantial impact on obesity rates but the same reductions in civil law countries would have 
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essentially no effect. This reinforces the view that it is not the ownership of motor vehicles per se 
that enables obesity through reduced exercise but the ownership coupled with the restrictions on 
their usage which enables obesity or not.   
These results are robust to adoption of different estimation methodologies, specifications, 
and panel techniques. One of the key results in this paper is that the common law heritage, 
despite its well-established superior performance in economic sphere of life compared civil law, 
turns out to have a more negative impact on human welfare by leading to increased use of motor 
vehicles and therefore increased obesity. 
 
2. DATA 
Our data come primarily from the OECD Factbook 2007. The available information allows us to 
form an unbalanced panel data set, which includes 147 observations spanning 29 countries 
between 1990 and 2004. The dependent variable in our analysis is Obesity, the percentage of 
residents who are obese. Key explanatory variables include: Motor Vehicles (number of motor 
vehicles per 1000 residents); Civil (1 if the country has a civil law tradition, 0 if the legal system 
type is common law); and the disaggregated categories of the civil law tradition, which are 
French, German and Scandinavian legal systems. Also, within the class of civil law countries, 
some were under communist rule from World War II until the fall of the Soviet Union, and we 
categorize these countries as “old socialist”. We use the La Porta et al [1999] assignment of legal 
heritage. Specifically, the common law countries in our sample consist of Great Britain, Ireland, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. All other countries in our data set belong to the 
civil law tradition, and are fairly equally distributed across more disaggregated civil law types. 
The French law countries include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and Turkey. The German law countries are Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea and 
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Switzerland. The countries having Scandinavian legal system are Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden, and the old socialist countries are Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and 
Poland. 
In this context, one may argue that La Porta et al. classify countries into French, German, 
Scandinavian and Old Socialist legal systems based on Corporations law, raising the question 
whether or not this classification is applicable to our problem. Note that this point would concern 
only the decomposition within Civil law countries, because Common and Civil law are 
universally different in their origins and codes. Within Civil law system, Old Socialist countries 
can be argued to possess sufficiently distinct characteristics to warrant their current, separate 
classification (see La Porta et al. 2007). The question is, whether or not countries with French, 
German and Scandinavian Law would possess distinct characteristics to be classified in different 
groups for our problem. We feel relatively better off at this point because, as mentioned above, 
these categorizations have been employed in a variety of empirical explorations in the literature. 
In fact, La Porta et al [1999]. themselves analyze the relationships between these disaggregate 
systems and political freedom, government intervention and public sector size and provision, 
indicating their differential effects.  We note that the difference is ultimately an empirical 
question, which will be explored thoroughly below. 
In the analysis, we control for PPP-adjusted Gross Domestic Product per capita (in US 
dollars), available from the OECD Factbook 2007. This avoids confounding motor vehicle 
effects with overall development effects on obesity. This is also in line with Cutler et al (2003), 
who use it to control for the effects of higher technology that facilitates mass food preparation, 
which, among other effects, results in consumption of greater variety of foods with high calorie 
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content, and obesity.4 While Cutler et al find that GDP per capita is insignificantly related to 
obesity, this result is based on cross-sectional data; we show that using panel data, it is possible 
to find a significant relationship. We also utilize the quadratic form of GDP per capita for a 
possible non-linear relationship. 
Turning next to the connection between obesity and motor vehicles reliance, Figure 1 
shows a scatter diagram for 29 OECD countries on motor vehicles per 1,000 residents and 
obesity in a cross-sectional context.5 It is evident that the unconditional relationship is positive. 
A panel data set enables us to look at a broader set of observations for the time period 1990 t
2004. There are 30 observations for the six Common Law countries and 117 for the 23 Civil Law 
countries. As seen through Figures 2 and 3, there appears to be a strong, positive association for 
the Common Law countries, although the impression is undoubtedly accentuated by the three 
U.S. data points in the far northeast corner of the scatter diagram. The relationship for the Civil 
Law countries also appears positive but is difficult to discern due to the scattering of observations 
in the northwest quadrant with fairly high obesity levels and low motor vehicles per capita. These 
are associated with the former Soviet bloc countries of Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic. Nevertheless, the slope of the regression line fitted is noticeably lower than in the 
Common Law case. The correlation coefficient for Motor Vehicles and obesity is only +.06 in 
these Civil Law countries compared with +.70 for the Common Law countries, with the former 
being insignificant and the latter being strongly significant. Although both correlations are 
positive, the coefficient for the Common Law countries is noticeably higher.  
o 
                                                
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
 
4 Cutler et al also use female participation in labor force as a control but we do not opt to used it due to high 
correlation between GDP per capita and female participation in labor force. 
5 We form a cross-country data set from the panel data set by averaging the observations belonging to the 1998-2003 
period. This period maximizes the number of countries that can be included in the analysis. Two exceptions are 
Australia, which provides data from 1995, and Poland, whose 1996 and 2004 observations are averaged.  
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3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our approach is to estimate a reduced form regression of the following form: 
(2)       ε+Γ+Β= VXY , 
where, for the 29 OECD countries, Y is the percentage of residents who are obese, X is a vector 
of variables including Civil, or the variables representing the disaggregated law systems, French, 
German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc; PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in natural logarithms) and its 
square, and time dummies which take the value 1 for each year in the data set.  Besides capturing 
non-model variation in obesity over time, time dummies also help eliminate the disadvantage 
related to drawing observations from an unbalanced the data set. V is a vector including Motor 
Vehicles and an interaction term between Motor Vehicles and Civil, or the interactions between 
Motor Vehicles and French, German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc. We expect Motor Vehicles to be 
positively related to obesity, with this effect weaker in countries with civil law origins where the 
use of motor vehicles will be more regulated. We estimate several variants of this model to check 
the sensitivity of the results. 
 
3.1. Endogeneity  
 The vector X includes exogenous variables and the vector V includes potentially 
endogenous variables. It can be argued that higher levels of obesity are associated with greater 
reliance on motor vehicles for transportation. Thus, we follow an instrumentation strategy 
whereby M2/GDP and petrol purchasing power (Petrol) are employed as instruments for Motor 
Vehicles. M2/GDP is largely utilized in the literature as a variable proxying the level of financial 
depth in a country. Higher levels of M2/GDP point to a broader based financial system where 
people have easier access to funds for borrowing. Thus, greater availability of funds for 
borrowing, leasing and other financial arrangements is expected to be associated with more 
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motor vehicles in a country. The other instrument, Petrol, is PPP-adjusted GDP per capita 
divided by the price of one liter of petrol as charged in petrol stations.6 The ability to purchase 
greater amounts of petrol for a typical level of income would provide people with stronger 
incentives to own a car. For instance, summary statistics in Table 1 show that while a typical US 
citizen is able to purchase around 88,000 liters of petrol (i.e., about 24,000 gallons) with average 
annual income (the maximum amount in the data set), a typical Turkish citizen can buy only 
about 5,500 liters of petrol. These, in fact, are two key elements in the budgeting decision 
concerning the purchase of a car. People must consider their access to the necessary funds for 
financing a car, and if financed, whether they will be able to run the car, given petrol costs. 
Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix display strong initial support for our conjectures. Motor vehicle 
ownership is positively associated with both M2/GDP and petrol purchasing power.  
 These variables possess the desirable characteristics of valid instrumental variables (IV). 
First, they are strongly associated with Motor Vehicles. The F-statistics obtained from the 
regression of Motor Vehicles on the IVs are in rough accordance with recommended F-values for 
strong instruments (see Staiger and Stock [1997] and Stock and Yogo [2005]). Second, these 
variables are expected to be exogenous to obesity; they are not caused by obesity. Third, they are 
excludable from the main obesity equation; both M2/GDP and Petrol are expected to affect 
obesity only through the motor vehicles linkage.  
The second and third conditions can be checked via Sargan overidentification tests.7 In 
the most comprehensive model where all variables are fully employed in the specifications, the 
Sargan test suggests that our instrumentation strategy is legitimate.   Finally, having valid 
                                                 
6 The data source for M2/GDP is World Development Indicators (online) for non-EU countries and International 
Financial Statistics (online) for the EU countries.  The data for petrol prices are obtained from International Energy 
Agency (2003). Premium Unleaded (95 RON) prices have been used (except Denmark, Japan and Korea, for which 
only regular unleaded (91-92 RON) prices were available).  
7 Given that our instruments are strong, the results of this test are reliable. 
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instruments at our disposal, we apply the Hausman test to determine if Motor Vehicles is 
endogenous. The test results indicate that Motor Vehicles and its interactive legal system 
variables are endogenous under a variety of specifications, but most importantly, in the largest 
set of models where instrumentation is justified.8, 9   Therefore, apart from utilizing OLS for 
comparison purposes, we employ and rely mainly on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methodology for inference.10 
 
3.2. Panel Effects 
 Besides making use of the pooled data set, we also explore the panel dimension of the 
data set extensively. For each specification we estimate, we adopt Fixed Effects (FE) and 
Random Effects (RE) methodologies to treat the country-specific effects in the data (in both OLS 
and 2SLS estimations). In addition, we test the validity of the RE treatment through Hausman 
(1978) tests, with the FE models forming the null. It turns out that in the OLS estimations, the RE 
models may exhibit correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables, while in the 
2SLS results, they are reliable. The RE model has the added advantage of keeping time-invariant 
legal system variables in the regression when addressing the panel effects.11  
 
                                                 
8 Where Motor Vehicles is interacted with legal system variables, M2/GDP and Petrol, too, are interacted with those 
variables in the instruments list. 
9 There might be a correlation between legal systems and M2/GDP and Petrol. During our instrumentation 
procedure, both the aggregate Civil Law variable and the disaggregated French, German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc 
variables are included in the first stage regressions. This leaves us with non-legal system effects of M2/GDP and 
Petrol to be associated with motor vehicles usage for the second stage estimations. This is what is needed as an 
exogenous source of variation for the instrumentation. 
10 We also considered public transportation availability as an instrument. However, it is difficult to measure this 
availability at the country level. One can get information on a few major cities through, perhaps, metro lines or 
stations per person. But wide availability of public transport in New York does not necessarily imply that the US 
overall, or even the state of New York has good public transportation. In addition, this measure would hardly change 
over time, limiting its inclusion in the panel exploration. 
11 Even if one finds the assumption of no unobserved effect correlated with the independent variables untenable, the 
main results are quite robust to the choice of FE vs. RE. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. OLS Results 
In terms of discussing the findings, the emphasis will be placed on the 2SLS results below. 
However, OLS forms a basis for further discussion, as well as a benchmark against which 
endogeneity is tested. Thus, we briefly consider those results first. 
 
Cross-Sectional Data. Despite a modest sample size, the cross-sectional dataset is useful to get a 
feel for the basic relationships. Model 1 of Table 2 shows that the unconditional relationship 
between Motor Vehicles and obesity is positive, but significant at only the 17% level. Model 2 
presents the unconditional association between Civil and obesity. It is found that the percentage 
of obese population in countries with common law heritage is, on average, 8.7% higher than in 
civil law countries. The distinction is highly significant. Model 3 disaggregates the civil law 
tradition into French, German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc. The evidence points to differing degree 
of distances between each of the disaggregated legal system types and the common law system. 
In particular, the percentage of obese population in the common law countries is, on average, 
7.2% higher than in the countries with a French legal system, 13.1% higher than in the countries 
with a German legal system, 10.1% higher than in the countries with Scandinavian law, and 4.8% 
higher than in the old socialist countries, with all differences being statistically significant. While 
these are unconditional relationships, it is worth noting that the disaggregated legal systems 
explain about half of the cross-country variation in obesity. 
On the other hand, Model 4 reports the conditional associations involving Motor 
Vehicles, Civil and their interaction. Motor Vehicles is estimated to be statistically significant 
showing that motor vehicle reliance is positively related to obesity. The intercept Civil is also 
positive, significant at 10%. Moreover, the sign and magnitude of the interactive term shows that 
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the slope effect is substantively and significantly different depending on whether the country in 
question has a civil or a common law tradition. Specifically, it suggests that motor vehicle 
reliance is positively related to obesity in Common Law countries, while the effect is almost zero 
in the Civil Law countries. Adding log GDP per capita and its square to the regression in Model 
5 does not make much difference to the results above, except the intercept Civil becomes 
insignificant. Moreover, just like Cutler et al (2003), we estimate log GDP per capita (and its 
square) to be insignificant in the cross-sectional context. 
The limited degrees of freedom available with the cross-sectional data do not allow us to 
explore additional factors. Nevertheless, it offers significant support for our suggested 
relationships between legal system types, motor vehicle usage and obesity.  
 
Panel Data. Table 3 presents the OLS results using panel data. It also lays out the structure of 
our analysis in terms of specifications and panel treatment (pooled, FE and RE), which will be 
adopted in the 2SLS discussion. From the outset, it is important to note that the Hausman tests do 
not allow the RE treatment for panel effects with the OLS specification. Hence those results are 
only suggestive. Nevertheless, both pooled data and the FE results strongly reaffirm the cross-
section results in terms of the suggested relationships, providing several important implications. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 present the unconditional relationships between Motor Vehicles and Obesity, 
finding a significant and positive pooled effect, which does not survive the FE treatment.12 
Models 4-6 suggest that Motor Vehicles is positively and significantly related to Obesity in 
Common Law countries, while this effect is almost zero in Civil Law countries, given the 
magnitude of the interaction term. Adding log GDP per capita and its square to the specification 
                                                 
12 The Fixed Effects treatment essentially removes the cross-country variation in the data and the remaining variation 
in the data is only due to within-country variation over time.  
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in Models 7-9 does not make much difference to the results, except the intercept Civil becomes 
insignificant. A curvilinear relationship is also suggested between GDP per capita and obesity. 
Models 10-12 disaggregate the civil law system into French, German, Scandinavian and old 
socialist country groups. The positive association between Motor Vehicles and Obesity still holds 
in the Common Law countries. The interactive terms between disaggregated legal systems and 
Motor Vehicles are all negative and significant, implying that the motor vehicle reliance-obesity 
relationship is significantly lower in those countries, though there are variations across 
disaggregated systems in terms of distance from Common Law countries. Note that the Civil 
Law effects survive the FE treatment (Model 11). Finally, Models 13-15 add log GDP per capita 
and its square to the previous set of results. The main findings remain highly robust to the 
inclusion of this variable, with the curvilinear relationship still affirmed. Controlling for motor 
vehicles per capita and legal heritage, obesity falls with GDP per capita up to a level between 
$22,000 and $30,000 and rises thereafter. 
 
4.2. 2SLS Results 
Before proceeding to the IV findings, we first discuss the relationship between our instruments, 
M2/GDP and Petrol, and motor vehicle usage. Table 4 displays the relationships using pooled, 
FE and RE treatment of panel effects. We are interested in the pooled panel data results and the 
associated model F-statistics to determine if the instruments are strong. [These FE and RE results 
are provided for the referee’s interests but can be removed from a final paper.] Models 1 and 4 
confirm the positive and significant relationship between Motor Vehicles, and M2/GDP and 
Petrol, respectively. Model 7 underlies our instrumentation strategy for the 2SLS estimation, 
showing that both M2/GDP and Petrol are jointly related to Motor Vehicles, with positive and 
significant signs. The coefficient 0.401 for M2/GDP implies that, broadly speaking, Poland of 
 16
2004, with one of the lowest M2/GDP values in the sample, would, for this reason alone, have 70 
fewer motor vehicles (per 1,000 residents) than Japan of 2003, having one of the highest 
M2/GDP values. This explains 30% of the actual difference between Poland and Japan regarding 
motor vehicle ownership during that period. However, more telling is the impact of Petrol on 
motor vehicle ownership. The coefficient 48.6 suggests that, Turkey in 2003, with the lowest 
Petrol observation in the sample, for this reason alone would have 403 fewer motor vehicles per 
1,000 residents than the US in 2002, which possesses the highest Petrol value available. Thus 
Petrol explains 60% of the difference between Turkey and the US regarding motor vehicle 
ownership during that period.13 Model 7 has an F-statistic of 9.5,14  which is close to the rule of 
thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for strong instruments. More specifically using the 
Stock and Yogo [2005] tables, we reject (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis that the bias of the 
IV estimator relative to the bias of OLS exceeds 20 percent. With statistically reliable and 
intuitive instruments that are fairly strong, we next turn to the 2SLS results. 
In Table 5 (models 1 through 15), we again employ a variety of specifications, estimated 
via various panel methods. From the outset, note that for models 4 through 15, the essential 
findings are qualitatively similar. Motor Vehicles is positively related to obesity percentage but 
not for civil law countries. Depending upon one’s preferences, either model 14 or model 15 in 
Table 6 is the preferred specification. Model 15 includes all the variables in its specification, and 
the Hausman test allows the RE treatment, which in turn enables us to keep all time-invariant 
effects in the model. Note that the RE model requires the assumption that there is no fixed 
country effect correlated with the unobserved error in the obesity regression. While this 
                                                 
13 These comparisons are based on the closest years available. Note that the US (2002) had 766, Japan (2003) had 
566, Poland (2004) had 375 and Turkey (2003) had 88 motor vehicles per 1,000 residents. 
14 That M2/GDP and Petrol provide jointly a higher F-statistic than their individual cases (Models 1 and 4) in the 
presence of time dummies implies that these two effects are reinforcing.  
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assumption may not be tenable, Hausman tests indicate that possible correlations are not 
statistically significant. Model 14 avoids the latter assumption but leaves out the level effects of 
legal regime which makes the interpretation of legal regime-motor vehicle interaction partial 
effects problematic. Nevertheless, both FE and RE coefficients are largely similar wherever they 
can be compared. 
First consider the prior models, which are largely suggestive. Using pooled, FE and RE 
treatments, Models 1, 2 and 3 (in Table 5) find a positive unconditional relationship between 
Motor Vehicles and Obesity, with its significance depending on the panel treatment. The Sargan 
test, as expected, fails to justify the instrumentation strategy for these models, possibly due to 
omitted variables on the right-hand side and the IVs’ picking up those effects. Models 4, 5 and 6 
(in Table 5) estimate the effects of Motor Vehicles, Civil and their interaction on Obesity, while 
Models 7, 8 and 9 (in Table 5) add log GDP per capita and its square to the previous set of 
models. Almost all signs are preserved in relation to the panel OLS results in Table 3; Motor 
Vehicles and the Civil intercept term have positive signs, while their interactions have negative 
signs. Insignificance of some coefficients can be attributed to the inefficiency of the 2SLS 
estimator. However, these models too (specifically, Model 4 and 7) do not pass the 
overidentifying restrictions test. The models may still suffer from omitted variables bias, 
whereby the omitted effects are contained in the instrumental variables M2/GDP and Petrol, thus 
enabling the rejection of the excludability condition. However, our main suspect is the 
aggregation bias that may be injected by the civil law variable. It may embed many 
disaggregated effects, suppressing critical information, thereby resulting in the omitted variables 
problem.15 In fact, as will be seen through Models 10 and 13 (in Table 5, cont’d), the 
                                                 
15 One sign of this effect can be observed in Table 4 by looking at the adjusted R-squared of the models employing 
the aggregate Civil variable and others which adopt the disaggregated legal system types, French, German, 
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overidentification problem is largely overcome with the adoption of disaggregated legal system 
types instead of Civil. 
 Models 10, 11 and 12 (in Table 5, cont’d) employ disaggregated indicators of legal 
systems French, German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc instead of Civil. Models 13, 14 and 15 (in 
Table 5, cont’d) add log GDP per capita and its square to previous models. An important result is 
the failure to reject the overidentifying restrictions for Model 10, via the Sargan test, at the 5 
percent level. The full specification of the model with the adoption of log GDP per capita and its 
square in Model 13 results in the IV approach being totally justified by the Sargan test, whose p-
value is 0.18. Using this specification, the Hausman test allows the RE treatment of Model 15 in 
relation to the null model of 14. Despite the difficulty in comparison due to dropped time-
invariant variables, reasonably similar coefficient magnitudes and standard errors across Model 
14 and Model 15 suggest that this test result is expected. If one values the time-invariant legal 
system indicators, then Model 15 is preferred for numerical implications; if one is suspicious of 
the assumption of no unobserved fixed effect correlated with independent variables, Model 14 is 
preferred but there is no practical difference between them. 
 The model implies that an increase of 100 motor vehicles per 1,000 residents is, on 
average, associated with a 5.6 percentage point increase in obesity in Common Law countries. 
The same marginal effect in countries with French, German, Scandinavian and old socialist legal 
heritage varies, however. The last row in Table 5, cont’d, provides the Wald statistic and p-value 
for the hypothesis that the coefficient of Motor Vehicles and the relevant legal regime/motor 
vehicle interaction term sum to zero. The Wald tests show that the effect in the Scandinavian and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Scandinavian and OldSoc. Accounting for the penalty for introducing further variables, the models employing the 
disaggregated legal system types have 13-18% higher explanatory power compared to the models with the aggregate 
measure of Civil. The models with disaggregated legal systems are able to explain almost 80% of the variation in 
obesity (see Model 13, Table 4). Compare also Models 3 and 4 in Table 3. 
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old socialist countries is not significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels 
(+0.056 sums up to zero with -0.041 and -0.047). In terms of the French legal system, the 
summation of +0.056 with -0.042 to zero can be rejected at 5%. This implies that, on average, an 
increased 100 motor vehicles per 1,000 residents increases obesity by 1.4 percentage point in 
countries with French legal heritage. This is noticeably and significantly lower than 5.6, though. 
Finally, in the case of the German legal system, we fail to reject the summation of +0.056 with -
0.066 to be zero at 10%.  
 We also find a strong curvilinear relation between obesity and GDP per capita; obesity 
decreases with GDP per capita at a decreasing rate. This is in contrast to the insignificant effect 
found in the cross-sectional analysis above (which was also found by Cutler et al 2003 in the 
same context). As noted earlier, the turning point for the fixed effects model (14) is around 
$30,000 per capita and for the random effects model (15) is around $22,000.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In examining the role of motor vehicles in international obesity, we find robust results. Obesity 
growth rates appear to be higher in Common Law countries of the OECD and there is a strong 
positive correlation between obesity and motor vehicles per capita in the Common Law 
countries. Using cross-country evidence from the 1990-2005 period, and pooled cross-section, 
time series evidence (fixed and random effects models), we also find strong statistical evidence 
that the number of motor vehicles per thousand residents is strongly and directly associated with 
obesity percentages across country and over time for common law countries; no such evidence 
emerges for civil law countries. These results continue to hold with two stage least squares fixed 
effects and random effects models. Despite some inherent limitations of the data, our findings 
represent significant evidence that over-reliance on motor vehicles can have a deleterious effect 
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in contributing to obesity. In the meantime it appears that common law countries are at great risk, 
but not civil law countries (with the possible exception of France); reduced physical activity is 
implicated in the obesity rise where government does not substantially restrict the use of motor 
vehicles.  
 Thomas Schelling [1984] has observed that most individuals adopt elaborate schemes to 
resist transitory temptation that is not in their own long-term interest. Our work suggests that 
common law countries may need to adopt such measures on a society-wide basis. Unfortunately 
the common law heritage makes it difficult to pass and enforce laws that circumscribe individual 
choice on transport mode and residential location. The challenge for these countries, including 
the U.S.A., is to find mechanisms for increasing overall physical activity so that individual 
choice can be respected without adverse health consequences. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Panel Data) 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. N 
Percentage of Population Obese (%) 11.39 10.1 32.2 2.2 5.98 147 
Motor Vehicles (per 1000 people) 510 503 769 88 114.65 147 
Civil Law 0.80 1 1 0 0.40 147 
Common Law 0.20 0 1 0 0.40 147 
French Legal System 0.37 0 1 0 0.48 147 
German Legal System 0.15 0 1 0 0.36 147 
Scandinavian Legal System 0.20 0 1 0 0.40 147 
Old Socialist Country 0.08 0 1 0 0.26 147 
M2/GDP (%) 99.54 72.39 393.94 28.53 72.34 146 
Petrol Purchasing Power (scaled by 10,000) 3.0148 2.7532 8.8367 0.5493 1.3113 127 
PPP-adjusted GDP Per Capita (US$) 24,414 23,841 57,392 6,682 8314 147 
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Table 2. Legal Systems, Motor Vehicles and Obesity –  
Cross-Sectional OLS Regressions (1998-2003 Average) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
Motor Vehicles 0.0101   0.0440** 0.0420** 
 (1.40)   (2.72) (2.48) 
Civil Law  -8.723***  18.54* 14.84 
  (-3.88)  (1.81) (1.29) 
French Law   -7.216***   
   (-3.12)   
German Law   -13.12***   
   (-4.94)   
Scandinavian Law   -10.14***   
   (-3.82)   
Old Socialist   -4.840*   
   (-1.71)   
Motor Vehicles*Civil Law    -0.0465** -0.0402** 
    (-2.69) (-2.05) 
Log Per Capita Income     -69.43 
     (-0.88) 
Log Per Capita Income Sq.     3.475 
     (0.87) 
Constant 7.993** 20.00*** 20.00*** -6.047 341.7 
 (2.11) (9.99) (11.2) (-0.62) (0.87) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.07 0.36 0.54 0.51 0.52 
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.42 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Legal Systems, Motor Vehicles and Obesity –  
Panel OLS Regressions 
Pooled and Two-Way Fixed and Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
Motor Vehicles 0.010** -0.002 0.003 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (2.17) (-0.39) (0.86) (4.16) (5.45) (6.99) (4.02) (5.00) (6.29) (5.77) (6.17) (7.28) (5.20) (5.79) (6.82) 
Civil Law    8.018*  18.61*** 4.670  16.53***       
    (1.92)  (5.03) (1.18)  (4.60)       
Motor Vehi*Civil     -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.045*** -0.044***       
    (-4.22) (-7.04) (-7.93) (-3.72) (-6.88) (-7.83)       
French Law          1.971  18.13*** 2.762  16.67*** 
          (0.55)  (4.80) (0.80)  (4.57) 
German Law          1.453  19.46*** 0.639  18.26*** 
          (0.31)  (4.47) (0.15)  (4.14) 
Scandinavian Law          9.037  13.52*** 7.880  12.51*** 
          (1.52)  (3.18) (1.43)  (3.05) 
Old Socialist          21.33***  30.28*** 15.27***  23.06*** 
          (3.93)  (6.52) (2.72)  (4.84) 
Motor Veh*French          -0.019*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.022*** -0.045*** -0.041*** 
          (-2.98) (-6.43) (-7.14) (-3.50) (-7.06) (-7.33) 
Motor Veh*German          -0.029*** -0.065*** -0.056*** -0.027*** -0.069*** -0.055*** 
          (-3.31) (-7.88) (-7.74) (-3.36) (-7.88) (-7.52) 
Motor Veh*Scandin.          -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.038*** 
          (-2.81) (-5.26) (-5.55) (-2.86) (-5.66) (-5.80) 
Motor Veh*Old Soc.          -0.058*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
          (-3.94) (-6.42) (-7.01) (-2.83) (-4.39) (-4.86) 
Log Per Cap. Inc.       -181.4*** -94.28*** -91.59***    -115.7*** -92.19*** -78.70*** 
       (-5.91) (-5.04) (-5.21)    (-4.23) (-4.57) (-4.25) 
Log Per Cap. Inc. Sq.       9.147*** 4.838*** 4.682***    5.970*** 4.518*** 4.05*** 
       (5.88) (5.12) (5.22)    (4.35) (4.41) (4.27) 
Constant 1.556 10.22*** 8.513*** -0.495 5.680** -8.658** 900.9*** 466.3*** 441.2*** -0.329 4.651** -10.11*** 562.5*** 475.6*** 374.3*** 
 (0.48) (3.89) (4.11) (-0.12) (2.52) (-2.29) (5.92) (4.97) (5.04) (-0.10) (2.19) (-2.60) (4.12) (4.72) (4.14) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11   0.57   0.66   0.75   0.79   
Number of countries  29 29  29 29  29 29  29 29  29 29 
Panel Method Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE 
Hausman – FE vs RE   28.47** 
(0.03) 
  36.65*** 
(0.00) 
  32.30** 
(0.03) 
  31.41** 
(0.05) 
  37.20** 
(0.02) 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Pooled: Pooled OLS regressions. FE: Fixed Effects. RE: Random Effects. Hausman – Fixed vs Random 
tests whether estimates from RE regressions are systematically different from their FE counterparts, with no systematic difference being the null hypothesis.                                     
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Table 4. M2/GDP, Petrol Purchasing Power and Motor Vehicle Usage - OLS  
Pooled and Two-Way Fixed and Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent Variable: Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People 
M2/GDP 0.729*** 0.186 0.430**    0.401*** 0.060 0.370** 
 (5.99) (1.11) (2.99)    (3.31) (0.33) (2.50) 
Petrol purchase    57.90*** -4.550 19.90*** 48.591*** -4.946 18.38***
    (9.66) (-0.72) (3.70) (7.33) (-0.77) (3.41) 
Constant 404.3*** 427.4*** 387.7*** 381.0*** 477.4***413.8*** 412.17*** 470.91*** 387.22***
 (8.94) (24.0) (18.2) (5.81) (23.1) (13.5) (7.04) (17.70) (14.91) 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 146 146 146 127 127 127 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.34   0.53   0.55   
No. of countries  29 29  28 28  28 28 
Panel Method Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE 
F-stat with TD 4.1*** 94.9*** 14.0*** 9.00*** 113.9*** 11.0*** 9.5*** 107.2*** 10.4*** 
F-stat without TD 46.4*** 49.1*** 38.9*** 107.1*** 46.5*** 22.1*** 61.3*** 55.3*** 23.9*** 
 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. TD: Time Dummy 
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Table 5. Legal Systems, Motor Vehicles and Obesity - 2SLS Regressions –  
Instruments: M2/GDP and Petrol Purchase –  
Pooled and Two-Way Fixed and Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Population Obese 
Motor Vehicles 0.017** 
(2.50) 
0.120 
(0.79) 
  0.022 
(1.52) 
  0.021* 
(1.86) 
0.062** 
(2.00) 
   0.044*** 
(3.27) 
   0.015 
(1.45) 
0.012 
(0.36) 
0.023 
(1.45) 
Civil Law    -1.556  21.92*** 1.746  13.13** 
    (-0.24)  (3.81) (0.27)  (2.26) 
Motor Veh.*Civil    -0.013 -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.021* -0.037*** -0.040***
    (-1.03) (-4.59) (-6.29) (-1.68) (-2.59) (-4.66) 
Log Per Cap. Inc.       -174.7*** -126.5*** -113.6***
       (-4.97) (-4.20) (-6.29) 
Log Per Cap. Inc. Sq.       8.850*** 6.562*** 5.936*** 
       (4.99) (4.12) (6.06) 
Constant 1.338 -53.47 -1.813 7.859 4.047 -10.02 872.8*** 628.3*** 544.9*** 
 (0.24) (-0.64) (-0.26) (0.99) (0.32) (-1.33) (4.96) (4.12) (6.17) 
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Method Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE 
Number of countries  28 28  28 28  28 28 
Hausman – FE vs RE   0.63 
(≈1.00)
  0.70 
(≈1.00) 
  ≈0.00 
(≈1.00) 
Sargan Test 17.36 
(0.00) 
  13.21 
(0.00) 
  27.25 
(0..00) 
  
Hausman - Endog 8.06*** 
(0.00) 
  14.73***
(0.00) 
  5.75* 
(0.06) 
  
t-statistics in parentheses for regression results. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sargan test (with small sample 
adjustment) for overidentifying restrictions, chi-square statistic and associated p-value with the null hypothesis 
that excluded restrictions are valid. Hausman test - FE vs RE: The chi-square test statistic and the associated p-
value for systematic difference between Fixed Effects and Random Effects coefficients, with “no difference” 
being the null. Hausman test - Endogeneity: The chi-square test statistic and the associated p-value for 
endogeneity of motor vehicles usage. Motor Vehicles is regressed on M2/GDP and Petrol in a first-stage 
regression and the residuals from this model (and its interactions with disaggregated legal system variables) are 
inserted back into the obesity equation. The joint significance of these terms – tested via a chi-square test - show 
that Motor Vehicles is endogeneous. 
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Table 5 cont’d. Legal Systems, Motor Vehicles and Obesity - 2SLS Regressions –  
Instruments: M2/GDP and Petrol Purchase –  
Pooled and Two-Way Fixed and Random Effects 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
Motor Vehicles 0.021** 0.099*** 0.066*** 0.020** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (2.31) (5.57) (6.23) (2.00) (3.80) (5.00) 
French Law -12.73**  20.44*** -11.33  17.84*** 
 (-1.98)  (3.55) (-1.51)  (4.13) 
German Law 5.746  27.95*** 3.330  25.35*** 
 (0.76)  (4.48) (0.48)  (4.45) 
Scandinavian Law 21.37  16.27* 15.82  15.73*** 
 (0.94)  (1.92) (0.77)  (2.95) 
Old Socialist 16.64*  40.32*** 6.019  24.32*** 
 (1.96)  (4.61) (0.63)  (3.50) 
Motor Veh.*French 0.009 -0.062*** -0.043*** 0.006 -0.048*** -0.042*** 
 (0.78) (-4.89) (-4.49) (0.40) (-5.21) (-5.96) 
Motor Veh.*German -0.036** -0.086*** -0.069*** -0.032** -0.076*** -0.066*** 
 (-2.54) (-6.27) (-6.46) (-2.41) (-5.95) (-6.93) 
Motor Veh.*Scandin. -0.061 -0.050*** -0.039** -0.050 -0.044*** -0.041*** 
 (-1.26) (-2.71) (-2.27) (-1.12) (-3.47) (-3.62) 
Motor Veh.*Old Soc. -0.048** -0.122*** -0.083*** -0.023 -0.059** -0.047** 
 (-2.08) (-4.22) (-3.73) (-0.94) (-2.37) (-2.74) 
Log Per Cap. Inc.    -118.1*** -87.36*** -83.39*** 
    (-3.30) (-3.81) (-4.77) 
Log Per Cap. Inc. Sq.    5.906*** 4.233*** 4.166*** 
    (3.32) (3.51) (4.41) 
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Method Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE 
Number of countries  28 28  28 28 
Hausman – FE vs RE   14.96 
(0.67) 
  ≈0.00 
(≈1.00) 
Sargan Test 9.84 
(0.08) 
  7.59 
(0.18) 
  
Hausman - Endog 32.99*** 
(0.00) 
  16.07***
(0.00) 
  
Wald – F stat.      3.91 
(0.05) 
2.92 
(0.09) 
0.71 
(0.40) 
0.30 
(0.59) 
Constant term included in all specifications. t statistics in parentheses for regression results. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sargan test (with small sample adjustment) for overidentifying restrictions, chi-square statistic 
and associated p-value with the null hypothesis that excluded restrictions are valid. Hausman test - FE vs RE: 
The chi-square test statistic and the associated p-value for systematic difference between Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects coefficients, with “no difference” being the null. Hausman test - Endogeneity: The chi-square 
test statistic and the associated p-value for endogeneity of motor vehicles usage. Motor Vehicles is regressed on 
M2/GDP and Petrol in a first-stage regression and the residuals from this model (and its interactions with 
disaggregated legal system variables) are inserted back into the obesity equation. The joint significance of these 
terms – tested via a chi-square test - show that Motor Vehicles is endogeneous. Wald test: F-test statistic and the 
associated p-value for testing whether the coefficient of Motor Vehicles and those of the interaction terms of 
Motor Vehicles with French, German, Scandinavian and Old Socialist, going downwards respectively, sum to 
zero. 
 
